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--------- ----------
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Appellant's

Brief

vs.
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In the Supretne Court
of the State of Utah
NEWELL J. OLSEN, operating under the name and
style of NE\\'ELL J. OLSEN
& SONS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Appellant's

Brief

ROLAND A. REESE,
Defendant and Respondent.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal from a judgment of dismissal
and from an order sustaining defendant's demurrer
(\vnich had long since been overruled, to plaintiff's
complaint, and from the- trial court's summary order
dismissing plaintiff's cause of action and discharging
the jury from further consideration of the case.
Appellant originally brought this suit in the city
court against respondent for a balance of $521.00,
alleged to be due and owing to plaintiff for labor and
materials supplied in the construction of a basement
apartment for respondent in his residence. The con-
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tract between the parties is in writing and is set out
in the complaint. It states ten specific items which
plaintiff, as second party, agreed to do (plaintiff to
furnish work and materials), and then the contract
continues.
"Any additional work shall be paid for by
first party as parties hereto shall later agree
upon. Any alterations shall be paid for by first
party as extra work. Second party shall also
furnish all hardware and shall do all work in a
good and workmanlike manner."
Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he carried out and performed all of the ten specific items
set out in the contract (except the wooden floor, which
was unavailable, for which the parties agreed upon a
credit of $150.00). Plaintiff further CJ.Heged that in
addition to the stated items in the contract, he did, at
defendant's request, much additional work and performed many alterations which are specifically stated
and set out in the complaint. Paragraph five of the
complaint reads:
"That the total cost and exr>€nse of all of
the said extra items as above enumerated
to $601.00, which together with the balance of
$995.00 due on contract as above stated, mal<:.es
a total amount due plaintiff for said construction
work for defendant of $1,596.00, of which defend.~mt has paid only the sum of $1,075.00, leaving a
balance of $521,00, now due and owing the plaintiff, none of which has been paid.

I

I

J
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"\\TIEREFORE, plaintiff demands judgment
against defendant for said sum of $521.00, together with costs of court."
Defendant filed a general demurrer m the city
court. but claimed nothing for it. His demurrer was
overruled, of which notice was duly given. The defendant then filed his answer. In it he admitted
execution of contract as alle·ged; admitted that he
had paid the plaintiff the sum of $1,075.00, but denied
the other allegations of the complaint. Then the
answer continues :
"BY WAY OF FURTHER ANSvVER AND
AS A FURTHER DEFENSE. the defendant
alleges that plaintiff did not do the work contracted in a workmanship manner and failed to
perform certain work and labor and furnish
material alleged in the plaintiff's contract; that
on the 21st day of August, 1946, the plaintiff
and the defendant went over all the items and
work performed by the plaintiff and the defendant paid the plaintiff a balance of $500.00 as a
complete and final settlement of all the con~
troversies between the parties hereto."
Defendant appealed from the judgment rendered
against him in the city court. In the district court
defendant moved and was granted leave to file an
Amended Answer in which he amplifies his Further
Answer and Further Defense, and specifically alleges:
"That the said contract sets forth that the
plaintiff should do the work in a good and workmanship manner; that the defendant was to
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furnish all first class material, furnishing all
necessary labor and materials, exclusive of
plumbing and wiring; and that the finishing of
the rock wall and sheet rock is not in accordance
with the contract and was installed in a poor
workmanship manner. That the rock wall that
was torn down was never replaced and was left
in an unfinished condition; that the bedroom
windows leak · and were not installed in a work~
manship manner and the hanging of doors and
other work was not done in a workmanship
manner, all to the damage of the· defendant in
the sum of $450.00."
Plaintiff filed a Reply to said Further Answer
denying that the $500.00 check was delivered to
plaintiff or accepted by plaintiff as full settlement;
denied the allegations of poor workmanship:
"Plaintiff denies that the defendant suffered the sum of $450.00 or any sum whatsoever
on account of alleged poor workmanship or defective materi,al, but alleges that he, the plaintiff, did his work in a reasonable and workman
like manner and with as good material as was
av~ilable and as plaintiff could buy on the market
at said time. Plaintiff denies all other allegations in said further answer not herein admitted
or qualified."
On the 20th day of March, 1948, a jury was duly
impanneled to try the above case. After statement
to the jury by court and respective counsel, plaintiff
was duly sworn and testified in his own behalf. After
testifying that he carried out and performed all of
the specific items of construction stated in the con-
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tract, he further testified that in addition he did, at
defendant's request, a considerable amount of extra
work (Tr. 29) as follows :
(a) Plaintiff put in a French door in place
of common door (Tr. 30), actual extra cost,
$6.00, ',\·hich he charged.
(b) Plaintiff built and installed dinette caband small cabinet in kitchen in place of
dinette counter (Tr. 31), actual extra ccst, $50.00,
which he charged.
i:~et

(c) Plaintiff installed a small built-in book
case, including casing and painting the same.
(Tr. 33), cost $15.00, which he chm:gcd as extra.
(d) Plaintiff built and installed a large
linen closet in place of an ordinary clothes closet
(Tr. :14), cost ~50.00, which he charged as extra.
(e) Plaintiff built and installed one additional linen closet (Tr. 35), cost $40.00, which he
charged as extra.
(f) Plaintiff built entrance into washroom,
cement steps, side walls, etc., at a cost of $125.00,
which he charged as extra. (Tr. 36).
(g) Plaintiff cut cement wall and built and
installed double window in southeast bedroom
(Tr. 36), cost $50.00, wrich he charged as extra.
(h) Plaintiff constructed cement window
wells, (Tr. 37), cost $30.00, which he charged as
extra.
(i) Plaintiff
replaced
cement
floor
in
kitchen, and washroom, sheet-rocked and painted
hallway, etc., (Tr. 39). cost $200.00, which he
charged as extra.
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(j) Plaintiff varnished sheet-rock before
papering, (Tr. 40), cost $10.00, which he charged
as extra.
(k) Plaintiff installed base boards on entire
basement, (Tr. 40), cost $2,5.00, which he charged
as extra.
Plaintiff testified that these extra items totaled
$601.00; that considering what had been paid
($1,075.00), there was still due and owing to the
plaintiff, a balance of $521.00 (Tr. 41).
Thus it will be seen that the defendant had actually paid the amount in full due under the written
contract,-for the ten specific items therein set forth,
-and in addition $80.00 on the $601.00 due for extra
work and alterations; leaving a balance of $521.00, still
due and owing to the plaintiff for said extra work and
materials.
On ·cross-examination, (Tr. 42), counsel did not
question plaintiff on his testimony given on direct
examination, but commenced asking appellant if he
was a licensed contractor at the time the contract was
signed. Appellant answered, "Yes, sir, I was licensed,
as can be verified by the State." Then counsel asked
appellant when ,he took out his license. Witness answered, ''I don't recall." We objected to this line of
cross-examination as it was outside the issues. (Tr. 43).
MR. DAINES:
I demurred to the complaint,
Mr. Fonnesbeck, on a general demurrer.
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THE COURT. · Objection overruled.
Then proceedings took place, in which the court
summarily sustained defendant's demurrer and dismissed plaintiff's case. (Tr. 43 to 53.)
ASSIGNJIENT OF ERRORS
ERROR NO. 1. The court erred in overruling
plaintiff's objection and in permitting defendant's
counsel, on cross-examination, to question plaintiff as
to whether he had a contractor's license at the time
the· contract was signed. (Tr. 43)
ERROR NO. 2. The court erred in sustaining
defendant's demurrer which had previously been overruled, without any prior notice or motion to reinstate
the demurrer or any notice that defendant claimed
anything under his demurrer (long since overruled).
(Tr. 47)
ERROR NO. 3. The court erred in holding
that as a condition precedent to the bringing of an
action or to the stating of a cause of action, that the
plaintiff must allege in his complaint that he was at
the time of the contract a licensed contractor.
(Tr. 47)
ERROR NO. 4. The court erred in holding,
apriori, that plaintiff was a contractor, and that he
was not a licensed contractor, when those questions
were in dispute, the plaintiff having testified as to the

.
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extra work done for which he was sueing, and that
he was licensed, and an issue of fact had thus been
raised on those questions on which plaintiff was entitled to go to the jury.
ERROR NO. 5. The court erred in stating to
counsel for defendant, "If you make a motion to dismiss, I'll grant it."
ERROR NO. 6. The court erred in dismissing the
plaintiff's case as follows:
"The record may show that the case is dismissed on the grounds that the plaintiff has
failed to prove that at the time of the execution
of this agreement that he was a licensed contractor of the State of Utah .and upon the further
ground that the complaint does not state a cause
of action." (Tr. 52).
ERROR NO. 7. The court erred in making and
entering its . Judgment of Dismissal of said cause.
ARGUMENT
(A)

PLEADING AND PROCEDUHE

I desire first to discuss the questions here involved,
from the standpoint of pleadings and procedure,-the
necessity of pleadings to raise the question here presented, to-wit: did the plaintiff have a contractor's
license?

It will be noted that the defendant's general de-

J
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murrer had long since been overruled; that the defendant had claimed nothing for it. It had been filed
simply as a time demurrer, so far as court or counsel
for plaintiff were advised.
It will also be noted that after defendant appealed
to the district court from the judgment rendered for
the plaintiff in the city court, that he filed an amended
answer, in which he amplified all of his defenses to
plaintiff's cause of action, but pleaded no def~llBe
whatsoever based on the ground that plaintiff did not
have a contractor's license.

That was a defense (if it existed) which defendant kept to himself and it. was sprung as a surprise and as an "ace in the hole", by which defendant
apparently hoped to (and in fact did) score a knockout,
a dismissal of plaintiff's case, without meeting the
issues on the merits. If counsel answers that he did
not learn about that defense himself until a few days
before the trial, the answer is that he knew about it
in plenty of time to advise or serve notice on plaintiff's counsel that such a defense would be made at
the trial. But had defendant so notified plaintiff, the
surprise element would have been lost, for plaintiff
would then have been prepared to meet that defense.
Our Statute, Section 104-29-2, requires that a
judgment must be on the merits of a case. except
in the specific cases of judgment of dismissal or nonsuit, provided for in Section 104-29-1. It is respect-
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fully submitted that the judgment of dismissal entered
herein was error, for it does not come within any of
the provisions of Section 104~29-1.
''Pleadings are intended to form the foundation
of the proof to be submitted on the trial, and should
advise the parties to an action what the opposite party
relies upon either as a cause of action or defense or
objection as the case may be." (31 Cyc. 43-4.)
It is submitted that the underlying thought back
of the above rule and the sections of our statute,
regulating pleadings and court procedure, is to avoid
surprises and have all suits and actions of litigants,
so far as possible, tried and settled on their merits.
To this same e:qd, to avoid surprises and misunderstandings, Section 104~9-1 specifically provides
what the Answer must contain by way of defense to
plaintiff's complaint. Thus:
"The answer of the defendant must contain:
( 1) A general or specific denial of each
material allegation of the complaint controverted
by the defendant, or any knowledge .or information thereof sufficient to form a belief; or a
specific admission or denial of some of the allegations of the complaint, and also a general
denial of all the allegations of the. complaint not
specifically admitted or denied in the answer.
(2) A statement of any new matter constituting a defense or counter~claim."
These statutory and well established court rules

J
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and regulations should, I submit, be kept in mind
when determining proper procedure under Section
79-5a-l, requiring contractors to take out a license.
That Section (79-5a-1) provides: "It shall be
unlawful for any person . . . to engage in the business
or act in the capacity of a contractor without having·
a license therefor as herein provided."
lt will be noted that there is no statutory provision providing that a contract entered into by an
unlicensed contractor shall be void. Neither are there
any statutory provision stating that an unlicensed contractor may not bring suit or may not recover on his
contract, or may not bring action to recover for the
reasonable value of services rendered,-for the labor
and material furnished and supplied by plaintiff, of
which defendant has had the use and benefit. The
statute merely makes the act of engaging in business
as a contractor-undertaking to do definite construction work for a fixed price,-without a license, malum
prohibitum.
\Nithout any pleadings or notice by defendant
(other than a general demurrer for which nothing was
at that time claimed), the trial court took the position
that the question of plaintiff having a license might
be raised at any time. and that a contract entered into
by an unlicensed contractor (thereby assuming and
impliedly finding- that plaintiff was a contractor and
that he was unlicensed) was wholly void. That as a
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condition precedent to the stating of a cause of action
by the plaintiff, it was necessary and mandatory that
plaintiff allege that he was a licensed contractor. And,
as the plaintiff had not so alleged in his complaint,
the trial court considered the plaintiff's case fatal and
irreparable, and not only sustained the general demurrer (previously overruled), but .ordered the case to
be dismissed, and thereafter, on March 30, 1948, made
and entered its Judgment of Dismissal of said case.
Appellant submits that such arbitrary rulings and
judgment were gross injustice and constitute reversable error. That inasmuch as the statute does not declare that a contract by an unlicensed contractor is
void or uinf.orceable, nor that an unlicensed contractor
may not recover for work performed or for materials
supplied, that plaintiff's contract was valid ansi his
complaint stated a cause of action.
Appellant submits that if defendant claimed a
defense on the ground that plaintiff had no contractor's license, it was his duty in view of the provisions
of our statute, to plead such defense, or, by special
demurrer or motion, raise such defense.
Appellant further submits that the rulings and
judgment of dismissal by the trial court imposed penalties and hardships on the plaintiff, not required or
contemplated by the statutes here involved, Sections
79-5a-1,-10. Appellant contends that as said statutes
are penal in their nature and are a restriction on the

J
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plaintiff's civil rights, they should be strictly construed; that the court should not go beyond the clear
expressed intent of the statute, particularly when the
nature of the business here involved (work and materials furnished by plaintiff in the construction of an
apartment), is considered.
Appellant respectfully submits that the better
and more modern rule is that when a person engages .
in business such as contractor, without first procuring the license, (assuming plaintiff had done so which
we do not admit), which the statute requires for the
privilege of doing such work, he incurs the penalties
which the statute in such case provides, and none
other. That if further penalty or hardship are to be
imposed for doing such act (furnishing, or undertaking to furnish, work and materials as a contractor),
which the Legislature has made malum prohibitum,
if done without a license, then such additional penalty
should be imposed by the statutes, through the Legislature and not by the courts.
In the annotation on this question, 118 A.L.R. 646,
we read.
"In a considerable number of the recent cases,
stress or reliance appears to be placed upon the
absence of any specific provision declaring void or
unenforceable the contract of an unlicensed person. See, for example, John E. Rosasco Creameries v. Cohen (N. Y.) (reported herewith), and
also other cases set out under headings "Food
dealers" and ''Liquor dealers", infra. And it

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14

was stated, arguendo, in Patterson vs. Southern
R. Co. (1938) 214 N. C. 38, 198 S. E. 364, that
the trend of authority was to the effect that
'when a person engages in a business without procuring the license which the state requires for
the privilege,' he incurs the penalties whiCh the
statutes pertaining to the license provide, and
none other."
In the Rosasco case, the New York Court uses this
language:
"We have here a statute which provides that
milk dealers shall not sell milk unless duly
licensed. The statute imposes penalties for its
violation by way of fine and imprisonment, b:1t
it does not expressly provide that contracts
made by milk dealers shall be unenforceable.
Nothing in this statute reveals an implied intent
to deprive unlicensed dealers of the right to recover the reasonable value of the milk sold by
them, and where the wrong committed by the
violation of the statute is merely mah~m
prohibitum, and does not endanger health or morals, such additional punishment should not b8
.imposed unless the legislative intent is expressed
or appears by clear· implication . . . Illegal contracts are
generally unenforceable.
Where
contracts which violate statutory provisions are
merely malum prohibitum, the general rule
does not .always apply. If the statute does not
provide expressly that its violation will deprive
the parties of their right to su3 on the contract, and the denial of relief is wholly out of
proportion to the requirements of public policy
or appropriate individual punishment, the right
to recover will not be denied."

J
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In the Rosasco case, the New York statute provided:
''Section 257. Licenses to milk dealers. No
milk dealer shall buy milk from producers or
others or deal in, handle, sell or distribute milk
unless such dealer be duly licensed as provided
in this article. lt shall be unlawful for a milk
dealer to buy milk from or sell milk to a milk
dealer who is unlicensed, or in any way deal
in or handle milk which he has reason to be~
lieve has previously been dealt in or handled
in violation of the provisions of this chapter."
Thus the ~ ew York statute was very similar ill
its provisions to our statute 79-5a-1. The penalty fo1
violation of each of said statutes is almost identical.
In the Rosasco case. the defendant pleaded as an
affirmative defense that plaintiff was not licensed as
a milk dealer during the period when it sold milk to
the defendant.
That, we submit, is the proper rule of pleading
and procedure in cases of this kind, where the statute
does not make the contract void, nor prohibits recovery if done without a license. The plaintiff's undertaking as contractor (building a basement apartment),
not being declared void by statute, and considenng our
housing shortage, certainly could not be said to be
·against, or in violation of public policy; nor can it be
claimed that the statute was enacted as a police
measure.
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In the case of Garwin vs. Gordon, 14 Pac. 2nd
264 (N.M.), an unlicensed real estate broker sued for
the balance of his commission alleged to be due him.
Judgment was entered in his favor by the trial court.
Appellant contended that plaintiff in that case was
= not entitled to judgment because he had failed to show
-he was in possession of a broker's license. The New
··Mexico Supreme Court, although observing that as a
general rule brokers who fail to take out a license in
violation of statute cannot recover a commission, yet
in view of the fact that the New Mexico statute fails
to provide that a broker's contract for sale of real
estate is void, or that an unlicensed broker may not
recover for services rendered, said : ,
''We hold that a broker regularly engaged
in the business as an occupation, at least unless
the transaction is shown to have occurred at a
time when its commission constitutes ,q misdemeanor (30 days after notice from th~ assessor),
may recover compension for a sale effected when
he was without such license."
If we are correct in our analysis and contention
as to pleading and procedure in these cases, then we
submit the complaint herein did state a cause of
action, and that the court erred in permitting counsel,
over our objection, to question plaintiff on cross examination (without any previous notice or pleading)

whether he had a contractor's license.
And the court likewise erred in sustaining the
general demurrer (which had long since been over-

J
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ruled and fo1· which nothing had been claimed at the
time) , and likewise erred in dismissing the plaintiff's

case.
(B) DEFENSE NOT AVAILABLE
TO DEFENDANT
Appellant further maintains that said judgment
of dismissal and said rulings of the court here complained of, we~e error for the claimed defense of
invalidity of contract, and are not available as a
defense to defendant in case at bar. because:
(1) Plaintiff's suit to collect the balance due
him of $521.00, is not based on the written contract;
but it is a suit on a quantum merit basis for the extra
work and materials, as set forth in the complaint and
testified to by plaintiff, furnished and supplied in each
instance by the plaintiff at the defendant's in;;tance
and request, in addition to the items stated in the
contract. Hence the argument of invalidity of said
contract dated March 20th (because no license was
issued to plaintiff until lVIarch 22nd), has no application to and does not effect plaintiff's right to recover
the reasonable value for the extra work and materials p2rformed and supplied by plaintiff in addition
to the contract, (and after license had been issued to
plaintiff).

(2) Appellant submits that defendant is furthPrmore precluded and estopped from asserting or contendi"!lp: that the contract set forth in the complaint
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is void, for the reason that the defendant has pleaded
and asserted a portion of said contract as part of his
defense to the plaintiff's action ;-an alleged failure on
the part of the plaintiff to perform his work "in a
good and workmanlike manner as provided in the
contract". Defendant admits that said contract was
duly executed. The defendant is thus relying upon
and asserting a provision of the said contract as his
defense to the plaintiff's action, to-wit: the provision
in the said contract that ·~second party shall do all
work in a good and workmanlike manner"; which defendant alleged plaintiff failed to do. :Qefendant should
not be permitted to assert or claim that the contract
is void because entered into by the plaintiff without
a contractor's license, and at the same time admit
the contract and set up provisions of the same as a
defense to plaintiff's action, when plaintiff seeks to
recover for work. and materials· furnished under said
contract. And certainly, he should not be permitted
to do so when the plaintiff is seeking to recover on a
quantum merit basis for extra work and materials
supplied by the plaintiff at the defendant's request, in
addition to the provisions of the contract.

{C) COURT ERRED IN ENTERING .JUDGMENT
OF DISMISSAL \VITHOUT GRANTING
PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO AMEND
HIS COMPLAINT
Appellant further contends that even though this
Court should hold that plaintiff was · duty bound to

J
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allege in his complaint that he was the holder of a
contractor's license "at the time he engaged in the
business or acted in the capacity of a contractor", that
the complaint did not state a cause of action without
such allegation, that the question whether plaintifi
held a contractor'::;; license could be raised at any time,
even under a demurrer (for which defendant claimed
nothing at the time and which had long since been
overruled), and that the court pruperly sustained such
demurrer; appellant contends that the trial court still
erred in dismissing plaintiff's case and entering judgment of dismissal without granting plaintiff leav~ to,
amend his complaint.
In this respect, case at bar· is very similar to the
recent case of Smith v. American P~cking Company,
130 P. 2nd 951, where the lower court .sustained de~
murrer to the COJI!plaint on the ground that it did not
a;ppear that plaintiff had an architect's license; the
court holding that plaintiff was sueing for services
rendered as an architect.
In the Smith case, no permission was granted
plaintiff to amend· his complaint and the trial court
entered judgment 0'1 the demurrer dismissing plaintiff~s case, in the same manner as the trial court
sustained the de~urrer and dismissed the plantiff's
action in case at bar. This Court held in the Smith
case, that although the demurrer to the complaint
was properly sustained (for S'pecial reasons which
V'is Court there observed), th8 trial court erred in
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entering its judgment of dismissal of the case without
granting leave to the plaintiff to amend his complaint.
Appellant submits that the same error was made in
the case at bar, even though, as stated, this Court
should hold that the demurrer was properly sustained.

In the Smith case, supra, tpis Court made a
couple of observations which we think have application to case at bar:
(a) This Court said. "The purpose and intent
of statute under consideration have a direct bearing
regarding the sufficiency of the allegations of the
complaint." Appellant submits that that rule should
apply in· construing the sufficie:p.cy of the allegations
of the complaint, in case at bar, and in reaching the
conclusion that plaintiff's com'Plaint did state a cause
of action, without affirmatively alleging that the
plaintiff had a contractor's license. That this is so
not only because this is a suit on quantum merit, but
also because the statute does not provide that plaintiff's contract is void, or that the plaintiff, as a contractor, may not recover for work performed aml
materials supplied without a license.
(b) In the Smith case, this Court further
observed:
"As a general rule where a person seeks
recovery for professional services for which a

J
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license is required as a condition precedent to
the rendition of such services for a fee, such
person must allege and prove facts which show
he was licensed at the time such se·rvices were
rendered."
We do not think that general statement should
control all. cases where statute requires a license, irrespective of whether or not the statute provides• that
no action may be brought, or no recovery may be had
by the plaintiff, if he held no license. In support of
the last quoted statement, this Court ci,tcs two
cases,-Westbrook vs. Nelscm, 67 Pac. 884 (Kan.), and
Hoxey vs. Ba~er, 246 N.\~T. 653 (Ia.). In the Kansas
case the plaintiff, a physician, was sueing for services
rendered. _The statute provided that ''In no case shall
::my person violating this act receive compensation for
services rendered." The Kansas Court held that the
plaintiff had to allege b. his complaint, in order to
state a cause of action, that he held a physician's
license. The Iowa case, supra, was likewise a physician
sueing for services rendered and the Iowa Court likewise held that under the statute requiring that . a
person who practices medicine must obtain a license,
and denying the right to_ sue for services rendered
without a license, a person who practices medicine
without a license cannot recover compensation- for
such services rendered, and that the plaintiff must
allege and prove that he is a licensed physician.
Hence, we submit that the general statement
made by this Court in the Smith case (to the effect
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that plaintiff must allege and prove facts showing that
he was licensed at the time services were rendered),
should be held to apply to cases where the statute
requires a license as a condition precedent to the
collection for services rendered, but it is not contr0lling and should not be held to apply to case at
bar where the statute has not made the issuance of
a license to a contractor, a condition precedent to the
contractor recovering for labor or materials furnished
by him as a contractor without a contractor's license.
In case at bar the plaintiff is not sueing for a fee,
nor for personal services rendered. This suit is brought
for work performed and materials furnished to defendant, but for which he now seeks to avoid payment
on the technicality that plaintiff did said work and
furnished said materials without a license. Hence
this case is much like the Rosasco milk· case, supra,
where the New York Court held that in the absence
()f statute prohibiting an action by a contractor, or
prohibiting any recovery for milk sold without a
license, the plaintiff could sue for and was entitled
to recover for th~ milk actually sold and delivered by
him, even without a license.
Case at bar is also similar to the case of Rock
Island Lumber & Coal Company vs. E. A. Wales Mill
· Co., 212 Pac. 97 (Kan.), where it was held that
failure on the part of a lumber dealers to comply with
an ordinance imposing a license on such dealer and
subjecting those who fail to take out a license to a
:fine; the Kansas Court said:
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"It does not, in terms or by necessary implication, make it unlawful for a lumber and
coal dealer to sell his wares in case of omission
to pay the tax, the penalty is imposed for neglect
to .pay the tax before engaging in business, and,
paraphrasing the concluding portion of the opinion in Simmons v. Oatman, by weight of more
recent authority and by the better reason, the
fact that the plaintiff had not paid $10 license
fee is not available to the defendant to defeat an
otherwise valid lien for material furnished to
improve his property.

''The judgment of the district court is reversed,
and the cause is remanded for further proceed~
ings."
In the Lumber Company case, supra, the Kansas
Court reviews a number of earlier cases from that
state, quoting from the case of Manker v. Tough, 98
P. 792 (Kan.), as follows:
"'Vhy should one party to a contract b2
allowed to avoid the payment of debts he has
contracted to pay, and thus gain an unconscion~
able advantage, because the other party deliberately, or through inability or mere oversight,
has failed to discharge an obligation to the city,
when there is available to the city both a civil
remedy for the wrong and a penal remedy
against the wrongdo2r? Was it any benefit to
the city in Yount v. Denning, supra, that one
party was reljeved from paying the other an agreed
compensation for services actually rendered, or
in Mayer v. Hartman, supra, that one party was
enabled to cheat his neighbor out of coal worth
nearly $1.000 ?"
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We submit the same questiran could be asked in
case at bar. Why should the defendant be allowed
to avoid payment of'his just debt which he has agreed
to pay 1 either by express contract or by implied agreement, and thus gain an unconscionable advantage over
the plaintiff, because (as claimed by defendant)
plaintiff did not have his contractor's license issued to
him until two days after the contract was signed, but
that he had it during the whole period while said
work was done?

(D) THE COURT ERRED IN DECIDING
QUESTIONS OF FACT AWAY FROM THE
JURY, AND IN ARBITRARILY RULING ON
SAID DISPUTED QUESTIONS OF FACT, AND
IN HOLDNG, APRIORI, THAT PLAINTIFF
WAS A CONTRACTOR AND WAS UNLICENSED, 'VHEN THE UNDISPIUTED EVIDENCE
ADDUCED WAS TO THE CONTRAR,Y, OR AT
-j> LEAST WHEN SAID QUESTIONS WERE IN
DISPUTE.
\Vas
tractor'?
The trial
held and
tions of
jury had
case and

plaintiff sueing, in case at bar, as a conDid the plaintiff have a contractor's license?
court, by dismissing plaintiff's case, in effect
decided both of those two important quesfact adverse to the plaintiff, even though a
been duJ.y sworn and impanneled to try the
had in fact heard part of the evidence.

(1) Appellant's first contention under this
heading, is, that as there is undisputed evidence in
the record, indicating a coutrary conclusion to that
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arrived at by the trial court, the plaintiff was at least
entitled to have both of tho~e questions of fact sub~
mitted to and decided by the jury, if the ('OUrt deemed
that a decision thereon was necessary in order for
plaintiff to recover.
(2) Appellant contends that the court erred in
holding, in effect, that plaintiff was sueing as a contractor. It is true that plaintiff sets forth the contract in· his complaint and alleges that he carried out
and completed all of the items specified in the contract. But the plaintiff also alleged that defendant
had paid the sum of $1,075.00, which (considering the
credit of $150.00, on account of flooring) paid the
contract in full and $80.00 over, to be applied on the
extra work and materials furnished by plaintiff. This
extra work was done as the work under the contract
progressed, and in each instance it was done at defendant's instance and request.
The plaintiff not only alleged in his complaint the
various and specific items of the said extra work, but
he also specifically testified to each item of said extra .
work and alterations. That he had performed the
same, in each instance at defendant's request. Also
the reasonable and fair value of said extra work and
material ordered by defendant and for which defend~
ant thereby impliedly promised and agreed to pay.
Hence it will be seen that what plaintiff was and is
sueing for is the balance $521.00, still due the plaintiff
as the reasonable value of said extra work and materials so furnished.
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That being true, can it be said he is sueing as a
contractor? We think not. Section 79-5a·3 defines
a contractor as follows:
''79-5a-3.
Contractor Defined.
A
con ..
tractor is a person . . . who for a fixed sum, price
or fee, undertakes with another for the con.
struction, alteration, repair of any building ...
or any part thereof."
There is no evidence that there was any fixed or
agreed price in advance for any of these extra items.
Plaintiff testified that defendant or his wife requested
that these extra items (additions or .alterations) be
put in; that he put them in, and the reasonable ancl
fair price for same. Plaintiff's testimony is not disputed. Under said facts, appellant submits that he
could not be classified a.s a contractor under the above
statute, nor held to be sueing as a contractor., so far
as the present case is concerned, for the amount due
for said extra. work is all that is involved in case at
bar.
Hence, we submit there was no necessity for t 1'r
court to decide the question whether or not the plaintiff was a contractor, or whether he had a contractor's
license. Those questions were immaterial so far as
the case at bar is concerned ; since plaintiff is not
sueing as a contractor, as that term is defined bv
statute. Hence the court erred in holding that the
plaintiff was sueing as a contractor and in dismissing
plaintiff's case upon the ground that plaintiff had not
alleged that he held a contractor's licens8 at the time.
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(3a) ~-\ppellant further submits that the court
erred in holding that plaintiff did not have a contractor's license at the time the contract was signed.
It is true that the contract is dated at the top as of
March 20, 1946, and that the letter from the State
Department of Registration (to which we stipulated).
stated that plaintiff's license was issued to him March
:22, two days later. But plaintiff testified that the
contract was not signed until several days after the
date it b~ars. This testim.ony is not contradicted.
Plaintiff also testified that his license had been issued
to him at the time the contract was signed. That
testimony also stands uncontradicted.
That testimony of the plaintiff,-that the contract
was actually signed some time,-"several days"after the date it bears. (Tr. 53). and that his license
had been issued to hi.m before that contract was
signed, should have been accepted by the court. for
there is no evidence to the contrary.
Yet the trial judge, (after he had sent the jury
out), contrary to said definite and undisputed testimony of plaintiff.- that he had his license at the
time the contract was signed,- arbitrarily decided
that plaintiff had not shown that he was the holder
of a contractor's license at the time the contract was
signed, and dismissed plaintiff's case for said reason.
(3b) Appellant further contends that the trial
court also erred in dismissing plaintiff's case on account of the implied finding that plaintiff did not hold
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a contractor's license at the time the contract was
performed. Even exclusive of plaintiff's testimony,
the evidence conclusively shows that plaintiff did have
his license while he carried out and performed the said
contract, and as well as while said extra work was
being done.
This evidence was supplied by the defendant. The
letter from the State Department of Registration, to
which we stipulated, stated plaintiff's license was issued to him March 22, 1946, two days after the date
of the contract. The license was issued for and covered the yPar 1946. Hence there can be no question
but that plaintiff did have his license at the time he
actually Pngaged in the business or actually acted in
the capacity of a contractor, and that is all that the
statute requires.
Vve do not believe that any fine could be assessed
or imposed against the plaintiff for a violation of the
statute, (doing work as a contractor without a
license) for merely signing a contract, if no actual
construction work was ever undertaken; nor until
actual construction work was engaged in by the contractor. If that be correct, then the important time
when the contractor must have his license, under the
statute, (before a penalty could be imposed), is the
time when hP. actually undertakes to perform the work
in question for which a license is required. As we
have noted, the plaintiff not only testified that he
had his license during said period, but the admitted
evidence from the State Department of. Registration
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show that the license was issued to him two days
after the date of the contract, which would thus conclusively show that plaintiff had· his license while the
work was being done. In addition to that, we have
shown that plaintiff also testified that he had his
license at the time when the contract was actually
signed. \Ye have also shown that the necessity of a
contractor's license to plaintiff does not 'apply in case
at bar, so far as the present suit is concerned, for
that is an action on quantum merit for the extra
work and materials supplied at the defendant's
request.
For each and all of the above and foregoing
reasons, we submit that the court below made gross
error in dismissing the plaintiff's case.
Respectfully submitted,
LEON FONNESBECK,
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
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